Introduction
During the recent global financial crisis, several countries were forced to nationalize failing private banks. Abn Amro in the Netherlands, for instance, is now fully owned by the Dutch government. As a result, the average share of government ownership of banks by bank assets has increased in high-income countries form 7.3% in 2007 to 10.8% in 2009, to fall back slightly to 9.9% in 2010. The increased prevalence of state banks is providing renewed impetus to the debate on the economic costs and benefits of state banking. While previous research has shown that state banks tend to perform badly, misallocate resources and lead to lower economic growth, relatively little is known about how state banks react to business cycle fluctuations. To fill this gap, this paper examines the lending behavior of state banks over the business cycle, and also fluctuations in the main types of bank funding that make this lending possible. In addition, this paper considers the relative accounting for non-performing loans by state banks, as differences in the reporting of bad loans over the business cycle by state and private banks are a potential mechanism to explain different capacities to provide new loans. Our analysis is based on a sample of 1633 banks from 111 countries over the 1999-2010 period.
We find that lending by state banks is less procyclical than the lending by private banks, especially if the bank is located in a country with good governance. We capture good governance by an index of government effectiveness, which increases with perceptions of the quality of public services, the degree of independence from political pressures and the credibility of a government's commitment to its own effectiveness. Moreover, lending by state banks located in high-income countries is even countercyclical. State banks also expand their credit relatively more during banking crises, which points at a stabilizing influence of state banks at a time of financial instability. Among private banks, we find that foreign-owned banks' lending is especially procyclical, perhaps because these banks have ready access to funding from their international parent firms to take advantage of local lending opportunities during economic upswings.
On the liability side, state banks increase their non-deposit liabilities relatively little during booms, especially if these banks are located in countries with good governance. Since nondeposit liabilities tend to be less stable than deposits, private banks' increased reliance on them during economic booms potentially puts these banks at risk during downturns. Private banks also report relatively higher loan quality during economic expansions, increasing their ability to ramp up new lending during upswings compared to state banks. In contrast, state banks report loan quality more evenly over the business cycle. Hence during recessions, state banks are able to maintain higher rates of loan growth, as they are able to achieve higher rates of growth of nondeposit funding and report lower increases in the growth rate of non-performing loans.
Overall our results suggest that state banks can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the business cycle as well as during periods of financial instability. However, the track record of state banks in credit allocation remains quite poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks as a short term counter-cyclical tool. For this purpose, alternative policy tools in the form of macroprudential bank regulation, including procyclical capital requirements and monetary policy are more appropriate, as they are more flexible than state ownership of banking and would not lead to credit misallocation resulting in low economic growth. 2 There is a substantial literature on the impact of state ownership of banks on banking performance and economic outcomes. A large number of cross-country studies show that state ownership of banking is associated with low bank efficiency and lower levels of financial 2 For an analysis of countercyclical bank regulation in Basel III, see Repullo and Saurina (2011). development (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001 , 2004 , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002 . State bank ownership lowers banking sector outreach (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007) , and leads to wider intermediation spreads and slower economic growth as well as greater financial instability (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Caprio and Martinez Peria, 2002) . Dinc (2005) shows that state bank lending is politically motivated, since state banks in emerging markets increase their lending relative to private banks in election years.
Banking outcomes also worsen with state ownership. For example, Mian (2003) finds that state-owned banks report higher loan loss provisioning and achieve lower profitability than private banks using data for a large set of emerging economies. Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007) report that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts. Cornett et al. (2010) find that stateowned banks in 16 Asian countries operated less profitably and had greater credit risk than privately-owned bank prior to 2001, although this performance gap was largely closed after the Asian financial crisis.
Individual country studies provide consistent results. Berger et al. (2005) find that the performance of state-owned banks in Argentina, for instance as measured by cost efficiency, was low in the 1990s, and improved considerably after privatization. Lin and Zhang (2009) find that the "Big Four" state-owned commercial banks in China are less profitable, are less efficient, and have worse asset quality than other types of banks that involve some domestic or foreign private ownership. Importantly, country level studies also show that politicians use government bank lending to provide political patronage leading to significant credit misallocation (See for example Cole (2009) for India, Khwaja and Mian (2005) for Pakistan, Carvalho (2010) for Brazil, and Sapienza (2004) for Italy). Not only is state bank lending more politicized and inefficient, it in addition generally does not serve the more credit constrained segments of the population, such as small and medium enterprises (Berger et al., 2008; Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu, 2011 In this paper our approach is similar to Micco and Panizza (2006) and Iannotta et al. (2011), but unlike these two studies we control for possible endogeneity of GDP growth to credit growth by using system GMM estimation. In addition, we consider a large worldwide sample of banks for the recent period from 1999 to 2010, including the recent global banking crisis. Furthermore, unlike previous papers we consider the dynamics of the main categories of bank funding and of the accounting for non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning to better understand the various 'channels' that influence state bank lending over the business cycle. Finally, we also examine differences in lending behavior among domestic private banks versus foreign banks for a large number of countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data including our bank ownership classification. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology, and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on an international sample of 1633 banks from 111 countries for the period 1999-2010. See Table A1 suggest that government ownership of banks is likely to remain prevalent in future years. In the empirical work, as a robustness check we also consider a further breakdown of privately-owned banks into domestic and foreign banks. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample of banks. The main variable of interest is the loans variable, which is the log of net loans in local currency and deflated using the national GDP deflator (see Table A2 in the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources). We consider several variables to represent the sources of bank funding: total liabilities, deposits, non-deposit liabilities, short-term funding, long-term liabilities, and equity. These variables are also constructed as the logs of amounts in local currency and deflated by the GDP deflator. To proxy for the cost of bank funding, we construct the net interest expense ratio as the log of one plus the bank's interest expenses over interest bearing liabilities net of the government T-Bill rate taken from IMF International Financial Statistics database (IFS, 2012) . As indices of the quality of lending, we consider the loan loss provision and non-performing loans variables.
The state bank variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank has a majority state ownership share. In our sample, 11.4% of bank-year observations concern state-owned banks. 
Methodology and empirical results
In section 3.1, we describe the system GMM estimation that we apply to our empirical specifications. In section 3.2, we present our results regarding the relative procylicality of state banks regarding their lending, funding volumes and costs, and reporting of non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning. Section 3.3 reports some robustness checks on the relative procyclicality of lending by state banks.
Estimation methodology
Our empirical specifications take the form of Arellano-Bond dynamic equations as follows:
where y ୧,୨,୲ is the dependent variable for bank i in country j in year t, X i.j.t is a set of explanatory variables, η i is a bank fixed effect, ߠ ௧ is a time fixed effect and ε i,j,t is an error term. In a regression to test for the procyclicality of lending by state banks, for instance, the dependent variable is the loans variable, while the set of explanatory variables includes the growth rate of per capita GDP and its interaction with the state bank variable. First differencing (1) serves to eliminate the bank fixed effect as follows:
We apply the system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) jointly to (1) and (2) using lagged first differences as instruments. 5 We take all explanatory variables -except GDP per capita growth, the bank ownership variables, government effectiveness and relevant interaction terms -as predetermined, meaning that current values of these variables can be correlated with post and current error terms but not with future error terms. In addition, the error terms are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, and lagged first differences of right-hand side variables are assumed to be orthogonal to bank specific fixedeffects to obtain consistent GMM estimation. Furthermore, we use two-step GMM estimation and the Windmeijer (2005) correction, which adjusts the covariance matrix for finite samples to minimize the downward bias in standard errors.
We report two main tests to determine the appropriateness of our dynamic GMM estimations.
The first test is the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions with as the null hypothesis that instruments are exogenous. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the instruments are valid. A further test is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the errors, with as a null hypothesis no autocorrelation in differenced residuals. Specifically, the second-order test in first differences tests for autocorrelation in levels.
Empirical results
We first examine the cyclicality of lending by state-owned banks relative to privately owned banks. To do this, we specify a regression where the dependent variable is the loans variable, and where the set of explanatory variables includes the growth rate of GDP per capita, the state bank variable, and an interaction of these two variables. 6 The coefficient on the growth rate of GDP per capita informs about the cyclicality of lending by private banks, while the sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable measures the cyclicality of lending by state banks. Table 2 reports 4 regressions of the loans variable. Regression 2 differs from regression 1 in that it includes a larger set of bank variables as controls. Starting from regressions 1 and 2, regressions 3 and 4 in addition include the government effectiveness variable and a triple interaction of this variable with GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable. In all regressions, real GDP per capita growth enters with positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% level, indicating that lending by private banks is procyclical. Estimated coefficients vary between 0.017 and 0.020, suggesting that a 1% increase in per capita GDP growth is associated with 1.7-2.0% increase in credit growth. In regressions 1 and 2, the estimated coefficients for the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank dummy are -0.013 and -0.014, respectively, and they are significant at 1%. Thus, an increase in GDP per capita growth by 1% is estimated to increase lending by state banks by 0.7% and 0.6%, which suggests that lending by state bank is procyclical but less so than for private banks.
In regressions 3 and 4, the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable obtain coefficients of -0.011 that are significant at 1%. The triple interaction variable obtains a negative coefficient of -0.005 in regression 3 that is significant at 5%, and a coefficient of -0.004 is regression 4 that is marginally insignificant with a p-value of 0.105. These negative coefficients suggest that state banks are even less pro-cyclical in countries with good governance. Based on regression 3, we infer that a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth causes a domestic bank to increase its lending by 1.7%, while a state bank in a country with average government effectiveness of 0.888 increases its lending by 0.156% (=0.017-0.011+(-0.005*0.888)). Thus, lending by a state bank in a country with average government effectiveness is procyclical, but far less so than for a private bank. Our estimated coefficients also imply that lending by state banks is countercyclical if the government effectiveness variable exceeds 1.2 (note that the maximum value of government effectiveness is 2.374 from Table 1 ).
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The regressions also pass the AR(2) and Hansen OIR specification tests, indicating the validity of the instrumentation.
8
Less procyclical or even countercyclical lending by state banks suggests that the funding of public banks and potentially also the cost of funding are relatively insensitive to the business cycle. Next, we examine which type of funding of state banks expands relatively less than that of the private banks during the upswing of the business cycle (and vice versa), and whether public banks are rewarded for the low procyclicality of their lending by relatively small increases in their funding costs during boom periods (and vice versa). The funding categories we consider, as found on the liability side of banks' balance sheets, are total liabilities, deposits and non-deposit 7 Similar results are obtained if we include an election variable to control for the impact of the electoral cycle on bank lending as in Dinc (2005) (unreported). 8 Results reported in Table 2 are robust to excluding countries with fewer than 5 banks or 20 observations (unreported).
liabilities, short-term funding and long-term liabilities, and equity. Our funding cost variable is the net interest expense ratio, defined as the log of interest expenses over total interest-bearing liabilities minus the government T-Bill rate. For each of these funding quantity and funding cost variables, we specify two regressions analogous to regressions 3 and 4 of Table 2 . The results are reported in Table 3 .
In several regressions in Table 3 , we observe negative and significant coefficients on the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank dummy, and/or on the triple interaction of these two variables and the government effectiveness variable, indicating that funding at state banks is less procyclical than at private banks. To start, in the total liabilities regressions 1 and 2, the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable obtains negative coefficients of -0.007 and -0.008 that are significant at 5%, indicating that the growth rate of total liabilities of state banks is relatively low during economic booms. In the non-deposit liabilities regressions 5 and 6, the double and triple interactions obtain negative coefficients with significance of at least 10%, indicating that non-deposit liabilities that grow less at state banks during booms, especially if these banks are located in countries with high government effectiveness. Estimated coefficients in both regressions suggest that non-deposit liabilities at a state bank in a country with average government effectiveness are countercyclical. From regression 5, for instance, we see that a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth leads to reduction of non-deposit liabilities of -0.976% = (0.026-0.018-0.020*0.888). In the short-term funding regression 8, the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable receives a negative coefficient of -0.006, suggesting that short-term funding at state banks is less procyclical. In the equity regressions 11
and 12, he triple interaction variable obtains negative coefficients of -0.007 and -0.008 that are significant at 5%. Parameter estimates imply that equity growth is less procyclical for state banks in a country with average government effectiveness, while it is countercyclical in countries with government effectiveness exceeding 1.286. In the net interest expense ratio regressions 13 and 14, none of the interaction variables is statistically significant, suggesting that the funding costs are equally procyclical for private and state banks. In regression 14, the GDP per capita growth variable obtains a positive coefficient of 0.001 that is significant at 10% so that generally funding costs appear to be procyclical. The Hansen test of the overidentifying restriction is passed throughout Table 3 , while the AR(2) test is also passed except in the equity regressions 11 and 12 where they are rejected at 5% and 10%, respectively.
Next, we consider whether private banks are able to expand their lending relatively more during booms, because they report higher loan quality during economic upswings. In particular,
we consider the relative reporting on non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning by private and state banks over the business cycle. The non-performing loans variable is the dependent variable in regressions 1-4 of Table 4 , while the loan loss provisioning variable is the dependent variable in regressions 5-8. In each instance, the 4 reported regressions differ in the number of included bank-level control variables and in whether government effectiveness and its interaction with GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable are included.
In the non-performing loans regressions 1-4, GDP per capita growth obtains a negative coefficient -0.003 that is significant at 1%, while its interaction with the state bank variable obtains positive coefficients of 0.002 with significance of at least 10%. Thus, the reporting of non-performing loans by state banks is less countercyclical. This could mean that the actual occurrence of non-performing loans at state banks is less countercyclical, or alternatively that state banks report loan non-performance more evenly over the business cycle. Analogously, in the loan loss provisioning regressions 5 and 6, the GDP per capita growth rate obtain negative coefficients of -0.002 that are significant at 1%, while its interaction with the state bank variable obtains positive coefficients of 0.001 that are significant at 1%. Hence, reporting of loan loss provisioning by state banks appears less countercyclical, either because loan deterioration is less countercyclical at state banks or because the accounting for loan deterioration by state banks is relatively conservative during booms. In the latter interpretation, loan loss provisioning at private banks is overoptimistic during booms, perhaps to enable these banks to take full advantage of perceived lending opportunities during economic expansions. However, in regressions 7 and 8, the triple interaction of the GDP per capita growth, state bank, and government effectiveness variables obtains a negative coefficient of -0.010 that is significant at 1%. This suggests that loan loss provisioning at state banks becomes more countercyclical as government effectiveness increases, perhaps because state banks undertake additional loan loss provisioning during economic downturns in an environment of high government effectiveness. Overall, our results on the relative procylicality of loan loss provisioning by state banks are inconclusive. In the loan loss provisioning regressions 5 and 7, Hansen overidentification tests are rejected at 10% level, indicating the instruments are not valid. In the corresponding regressions 6 and 8 that include additional bank-level controls, however, these tests are passed.
Robustness checks on the procyclicality of lending
Private banks can be domestic or foreign-owned. Foreign-owned banks tend to be subsidiaries of international banks. This potentially enables them to obtain additional funding from the international parent bank in case their local profitable lending opportunities expand.
Thus, with a more elastic supply of funds, foreign banks may be able to expand their lending relatively more during economic upswings. To test this, we re-estimate regressions 1 and 2 of to affect this procyclicality in the pooled sample in Table 2 .
Banking crises may lead to a scarcity of bank credit. Thus, the stabilization of credit by state banks is potentially most useful during a banking crisis. To conclude this section, we consider how relative lending by state banks and its degree of procylicality vary over crisis and non-crisis periods. To start, regressions 1-4 of 
Conclusion
This paper finds that lending by state banks is less procyclical than the lending by private banks, especially if the bank is located in a country with good governance, as proxied by indicators of government effectiveness. Moreover, lending by state banks in high income countries is even countercyclical. Among private banks, we find that foreign-owned banks' lending is especially procyclical, perhaps because these banks have ready access to funding from their international parent firms to take advantage of local lending opportunities during economic upswings. State banks also expand their credit relatively more during banking crises, which suggests a stabilizing influence of state banks at a time of financial instability.
On the liability side, state banks expand their non-deposit liabilities relatively little during booms, especially if these banks are located in countries with good governance. In contrast, the relative increase in non-deposit liabilities of private banks during economic booms puts these banks at some risk, as this type of funding may be less stable than funding through deposits.
Public banks report relatively high additional non-performing loans during economic upswings. This may reflect either that the relative loan quality of state banks deteriorates during expansions (improves during economic downturns), or that state banks report loan nonperformance more evenly over the business cycle. Overall our results suggest that state banks can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the business cycle as well as during periods of financial instability. However, the track record of state banks in credit allocation remains quite poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks as a short term counter-cyclical tool.
Furthermore, an important question is whether this credit expansion during the downturn is the result of lending to the most constrained borrowers, such as small and medium enterprises or to larger politically favored enterprises. Another issue is whether state bank lending retrenches after crises consistent with the spirit of counter-cyclical lending. We leave these questions for further research.
Appendix. Loans is log of net loans over GDP deflator. Liabilities is log of total liabilities over GDP deflator. Deposits is log of deposits over GDP deflator. Non-deposit liabilities is log of non-deposit liabilities over GDP deflator. Short-term funding is log of deposits and short-term funding over GDP deflator. Long-term liabilities is log of total liabilities minus short-term funding over GDP deflator. Equity is log of equity over GDP deflator. Net interest expense ratio is interest expenses over total interest-bearing liabilities minus government T-Bill rate. Loans loss provisioning is log of loan loss provisions over net loan ratio plus one. Non-performing loans is log of non-performing loans over gross loans plus one. State bank, Domestic bank and Foreign bank are dummy variables that equals 1 if a bank is stateowned, domestically and privately owned or foreign-owned and privately owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Liabilities is log of total liabilities over GDP deflator. Deposits is log of deposits over GDP deflator. Non-deposit liabilities is log of non-deposit liabilities over GDP deflator. Short-term funding is log of short-term funding including deposits over GDP deflator. Long-term liabilities is log of total liabilities minus shortterm funding over GDP deflator. Equity is log of equity over GDP deflator. Net interest expense ratio is log of interest expenses over total interest-bearing liabilities minus government T-Bill rate. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank and saving bank are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars.
Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). The pvalues for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 4 . The determinants of non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning
The dependent variables are non-performing loans , which is log of non-performing loans over gross loans plus one, in regressions 1-4 and Loans loss provisioning, which is log of loan loss provisions over net loan ratio plus one, in regressions 5-8. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is the net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank and saving bank are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005) . The p-values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(1) Table 6 . Bank loans in high income countries and developing countries
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is the share of net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Table 7 . Bank lending during banking crises
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Banking crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is in a banking crisis. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank and saving bank are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005) . The p-values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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